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YAKUZA: THE WARLORDS 
OF JAPANESE 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
LT. BRUCE A. GRAGERT* 
The power of the yakuza, Japan's legendary crime syndi-
cates, reaches into all areas of Japan's economic life and 
politics. Composed of some 3,000 separate, tightly-knit 
gangs, with over 80,000 members, the yakuza survive de-
spite Japan's 1992 Anti-gang law and other government 
measures. While the range of their traditional activities 
has been somewhat reduced, they have compensated by 
turning to more sophisticated types of crime and by ex-
panding their operations abroad - mostly to Southeast 
Asia, parts of Latin America, and the U.S. Estimates of 
their annual income from criminal activities and their 
25,000 legitimate "front" organizations run to as high as 
70 billion dollars, with some 500 million dollars traced 
to the U.S. The author examines the history, societal con-
text, organizational structure, activities and tactics of the 
yakuza and concludes with an assessment of how, and 
the extent to which their power and criminal operations 
can be curbed. 
* Lt. Bruce A Gragert, JAGC, USNR, born Albion, Nebraska,May 9, 1970; admit-
ted to bar, 1996, Nebraska and U.S. District Court, District of Nebraska. Education: 
University of Nebraska at Omaha (B.S., magna cum laude, Criminal Justice, 1992); 
Creighton University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1996); Naval Justice School (with hon-
ors, 1996). Recipient of the Nebraska State Bar Foundation Silver Quill Award, 1996. 
Military Service: Commissioned as an Ensign in the Judge Advocate General Corps, 
United States Naval Reserve, 1996. Stationed at Naval Legal Service Branch Office 
Lemoore, Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Member: Nebraska State and Ameri-
can Bar Associations; State Bar of Nebraska. Practice Areas: Military Law, Criminal 
Law, Administrative Law, and Family Law. Married to the former Tami Ervin. Chil-
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When people think about international trade and transactions 
they think about multinational corporations conducting 
legitimate business in commodities such as cars, oil, 
electronics, textiles, etc. However, there is a darker side to 
international business transactions that involves international 
organized crime groups who deal in "commodities" such as 
I 
narcotics, weapons, counterfeiting, and the smuggling of 
women for the sex slave trade, to name just a few. 
Some of the wealthiest, most organized and sophisticated of 
these international organized crime groups are 300 year-old 
Japanese groups called the yakuza. The majority of these 
yakuza syndicates operate in and out of Japan; however, there 
are many yakuza syndicates expanding their operations all 
over the world to every expatriate Japanese community. This 
international expansion of the yakuza and their activities will 
probably continue due to their increasing involvement in the 
drug and gun trade, and, more importantly, because of their 
ever increasing involvement in highly sophisticated financial 
crimes which have the potential to affect the economies of 
foreign nations. More importantly, the yakuza syndicates, 
unlike other ethnic organized crime groups, are, to a certain 
degree, readily accepted by Japanese society and heavily 
connected to the highest levels of government; factors which 
will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate 
them from the national and international scene. 
Therefore, it is important that governments and law 
enforcement officials around the world understand the history, 
organization, structure, "business" practices and tactics, and 
the future of these yakuza syndicates, if they are to combat the 
"new" wave of organized crime groups in their countries. To 
understand the motivation and mechanisms of the yakuza, it is 
essential to have some knowledge of their long and complex 
history. 
dren: Katarina Ann Gragert and Nicolas Daniel Todd Gragert. Parents: Daniel James 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE YAKUZA 
The history of the yakuza is filled with tales of yakuza Robin 
Hoods coming to the aid of the common people. The heroes of 
these tales are society's victims who bettered their lives and 
lived the life of the outlaw with dignity. These tales stand at 
the heart of the yakuza's self-image, and of public perception as 
well. The police and most scholars challenge the accuracy of 
these Robin Hood tales, but the feeling persists among the 
Japanese that organized crime in Japan bears a noble past. To 
understand this romantic image of the yakuza, one must go 
back nearly four centuries to an era that is the source of 
countless modern legends in Japan where the sword and the 
samurai reigned supreme. 
A. MACHI-YAKKO AND HATAMOTO-YAKKO 
The modern-day yakuza are believed to be the spiritual, more 
so than historical, descendants of the outlaw ronin (masterless 
samurai) of the 17th century.1 When the Tokugawa Shogunate 
brought peace to Japan, most samurai were left unemployed. 
Knowing nothing other than combat, many of these ronin 
formed into outlaw gangs called the hatamoto-yakko (servants 
of the shogun).2 The hatamoto-yakko went around the 
countryside terrorizing and robbing the local citizens.3 
While these criminal groups might appear to be the true 
fathers of the yakuza, today's yakuza identify not with the 
hatamoto-yakko, but with their historic enemies, the machi-
yakko (servants of the town).4 The machi-yakko were bands of 
young townspeople and ron in who, as fear and resentment 
grew, formed into groups to defend themselves from the 
frequent attacks of the hatamoto-yakko.5 Like the yakuza of 
today, the machi-yakko were adept gamblers, and they 
1. FLORENCE RoME, THE TA'ITOOED MEN 48 (1975). 
2. DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: THE EXPLOSNE ACCOUNT OF 
JAPAN'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 15 (1986). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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developed a close relationship with their leaders that may have 
been a precedent for the tightly-knit modern yakuza 
syndicates.6 The villagers admired the machi-yakko standing 
up to the hatamoto-yakko, and they revered them as folk heroes 
and Robin Hoods. 
It is understandable that the modern-yakuza, who see 
themselves as honorable outlaws, have chosen to look upon the 
machi-yakko as their spiritual ancestors. But a direct 
historical connection is hard to make because both yakko 
groups disappeared by the late 17th century after repeated 
crackdowns by the shogunate.' Although the machi-yakko 
probably performed some honorable acts, they were, in truth, 
also involved in criminal activities and largely known as 
"disorderly rogues,'.s Therefore, the machi-yakko owe their 
reputation not so much to their deeds, but to legend, in this 
case, to 18th century plays in which they are portrayed as 
champions of the weak.9 
B. TEKIYA AND BAKUTO 
The early yakuza did not appear until the middle of the 18th 
century. These early yakuza were the enterprising members of 
, a medieval underworld who today are widely seen as the true 
ancestors of the modern yakuza: the bakuto (traditional 
gamblers) and the tekiya (street peddlers).l0 Today, alongside 
the pictures of godfathers that adorn the walls of yakuza 
headquarters are family trees that link the modern group, 
however precariously, to the old bakuto and tekiya gangs.ll 
What is so unusual is that such ancestral connections are made 
not by blood, but through adoption.12 So distinctive were the 
habits of these two groups that Japanese police today still 
6. Id. at 15. 
7. Id. at 16. 
B. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Hiroaki Iwai, Organized Crime in Japan, in ORGANIZED CRIME: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTNE 20B (Robert J. Kellyed., 1986). 
11. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at lB. 
12.Id. 
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classify most yakuza as either bakuto or tekiya; although, a 
third group, the gurentai (hoodlums), was added after World 
War 11.13 
Each group had its own membership, origin, and territory, with 
its own kumicho (boss).14 Furthermore, each group had its own 
distinctive group structure, behavior patterns, codes, values, 
and jargon.15 Additionally, the ranks of both groups were 
largely filled with the same types of people - the poor, the 
landless, delinquents, and ancestral outcasts called 
burakumin, who were people who worked with dead animals, 
such as leather-workers, or in "unclean" occupations, such as 
undertaking. IS Finally, the bakuto and tekiya each stuck 
closely to their unique area to such an extent that they could 
operate within the same small territory without conflict: the 
bakuto operated along the busy highways and towns; while the 
tekiya worked in the street-markets and fairs.17 
1. Tekiya 
By the mid-1700's, the tekiya banded together for mutual 
interest and protection from the oppression of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate. The tekiya gangs established control over the 
portable booths in market fairs held at temples and shrines, 
and they had a reputation for shoddy goods and deceptive 
salesmanship. IS The tekiya were organized according to feudal 
status with members falling into one of five ranks: boss, 
underboss, officers, enlisted men, and apprentices.19 The new 
members began by living in the boss's house where they did 
menial chores while learning the business.2o The new members 
would then join the enlisted men in peddling the boss's goods 
around the country, and only after the new members returned 
13.ld. 
14. ROBERT Y. THORTON & KATSUYA ENDO, PREVENTING CRIME 1N AMERICA AND 
JAPAN 169 (1992). 
15. Iwai, supra note 10, at 208. 
16. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 22. 
17.ld. at 18. 
18. ld. at 21. 
19.1d. 
20.ld. 
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with favorable results were they admitted as full-status 
members.2l Furthermore, all tekiya members were bound by a 
strict organization, an authoritarian oyabun (literally, parent 
role), and the following "Three Commandments of Tekiya: (1) 
Do not touch the wife of another member; (2) Do not reveal the 
secrets of the organization to the police; and (3) Keep strict 
loyalty to the oyabun-kobun (literally, father-role/child-role) 
relationship. "22 
The tekiya bosses controlled the allocation of market-stalls and 
to some extent the availability of goods which were to be sold?3 
Additionally, the bosses demanded payment from street 
peddlers for the privilege of opening their stalls and for 
"protection" from anything happening to their stalls.24 Those 
peddlers who refused payment had their goods stolen, their 
customers driven away, and were physically assaulted.25 This 
kind of extortion continues to the present day. 
While there were territorial fights between tekiya gangs, a good 
deal of cooperation existed between them, for as tekiya 
members traveled from fair to fair they inevitably fell under 
the care of other bosses who, upon payment, would see to it 
that the members were assigned a favorable place to open their 
stalls.26 
Unlike the bakuto, the tekiya operations were mostly legal. 
Moreover, feudal authorities increased the power of the tekiya 
bosses by granting official recognition of their status between 
the years 1735 and 1740.27 The shogunate granted the tekiya 
bosses this nearly official samurai status in order to reduce 
widespread fraud among the gangs and to prevent future turf 
wars.28 With such legitimacy, and with the rapid growth of 
21. ld. 
22. ld. at 21. 
23.ld. 
24. ld. at 22. 
25.ld. 
26.ld. 
27.ld. 
28. ld. at 22. 
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towns, the tekiya gangs began to spread and began organizing 
market fairs of their own. Despite this official legitimacy, 
however, the gangs continued their criminal activities, such as 
extortion, protection rackets, and gang wars. 
2. Bakuto 
The first bakuto gangs were recruited by Tokugawa 
government officials who were responsible for irrigation and 
construction projects.29 These construction efforts required 
large payments of money to the laborers, money that the 
government officials schemed to get back by hiring bakuto to 
gamble with the workers.30 Later on the bakuto organized into 
disciplined groups, and they began operating along the major 
highways of feudal Japan. The bakuto gave the modernyakuza 
its central tradition of gambling, finger-cutting, tattooing, and 
the first use of the word yakuza. 31 
The term yakuza is derived from the worst possible hand in the 
card game hana fuda: a hand consisting of the cards 8 (ya), 9 
(ku), and 3 (za).32 The losing combination of ya-ku-za came to 
be used widely among the early bakuto gangs to denote 
something worthless, and it was later applied to the gamblers 
themselves.33 For years the word yakuza was limited to the 
bakuto gangs - some yakuza purists today insist that the only 
true yakuza are the gamblers - but by the 20th century, the 
word gradually came to be used by the public to apply to both 
bakuto and tekiya gangs.34 
The early bakuto groups developed a set of rules that included 
strict adherence to secrecy, obedience to the oyabun-kobun 
system, and a ranking order determining one's status and role 
within the groUp.35 Total control rested with the oyabun. New 
29. Id. at 23. 
30.Id. 
31.Id. 
32. PATRICKJ. RYAN, ORGANIZED CRIME: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 57 (1995). 
33.Id. 
34. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 24. 
35.Id. 
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recruits started out as apprentices doing menial tasks for the 
oyabun, and promotions were based on a member's 
performances during gang fights, gambling skills, and loyalty 
to the oyabun.36 
Despite some bloody territorial disputes, the bakuto generally 
helped one another out. One example was the bakuto's system 
of "travelers", a custom by which gamblers would visit the boss 
of each region on their route, stay several days, and receive a 
small amount of money for expenses.37 
As stated previously, certain early bakuto gangs were granted 
a measure of official sanction, although less formally than the 
tekiya, and they became adept at working with the authorities; 
some bakuto oyabun were even deputized.3s Such agreements 
with the police allowed the gangsters to consolidate and expand 
their power. Similar agreements later formed the basis for 
political corruption that reached to the highest levels of the 
Japanese government in modern times. 
C. MODERNIZATION OF THE YAKUZA 
By the turn of the 20th century, Japan had evolved into a 
complex and rapidly modernizing society. The people 
witnessed the evolution of their first parliament and political 
parties and the growth of a powerful, autonomous military. As 
the country modernized, the yakuza expanded their activities. 
The gangs became entrenched in organizing day laborers for 
construction jobs and in recruiting stevedores for the 
increasing business on the docks.39 However, gambling still 
remained the chief source of income for the bakuto gangs, and 
the tekiya also maintained their traditional operations in the 
street stalls.40 Additionally, many yakuza bosses started 
legitimate businesses to act as fronts for the group's criminal 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 27. 
38. Id. at 26. 
39. Id. at 32. 
40.Id. 
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activities, and they began a custom, which has survived today, 
of bribing local police and government officials.41 
1. Establishing Political Connections 
Both bakuto and tekiya groups continued to cultivate political 
connections and gradually some groups developed close ties to 
important officials.42 The gangs wanted some measure of 
government sanction or at least some freedom from police 
crackdowns, and they saw cooperation as the key. The 
government used the gangsters to stifle labor unrest. The 
relationship between the gangsters and political officials was 
always on the conservative side, but late in the 19th century 
this relationship evolved into ultranationalistic overtones.43 
This ultranationalism emerged due to the efforts of a man born 
in the mid-1800's in the city of Fukuoka named Mitsuru 
Toyama, and it was Toyama who would forever change the 
course of both organized crime and politics in Japan, joining 
the two together in a way that endures to the present day.44 
Toyama started an ultranationalist secret society called the 
Dark Ocean Society that wanted Japanese expansion abroad 
and authoritarian rule at home.45 The Dark Ocean Society 
waged a campaign of terror, blackmail, and assassination to 
exert influence over military officers and government officials 
in order to achieve the goal of a new social order in Japan.46 
In 1892, during the first ever national elections in Japan, 
Toyama greeted it with the first ever large-scale operation 
between rightists and yakuza.47 Toyama's Dark Ocean Society 
agents joined with 300 members of a yakuza gang to wage a 
violent campaign in support of conservative politicians.48 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 32. 
44. [d. at 33. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 34. 
48. [d. 
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Suprisingly, this rightist-gangster force was joined by 
policemen, who had been ordered by the Minister of Home 
Affairs to assist the rightist-gangster group in harassing anti-
government opponents.49 This group was also responsible for 
the assassination of the Queen of Korea which led to the 
Japanese invasion of Korea in 1895.50 
These secret societies fmanced their operations through 
criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution, protection 
rackets, strike breaking, blackmail, and control of laborers, 
entertainers, and street peddlers. These secret societies 
attracted the bosses of local tekiya and bakuto gangs which 
began a process that to this day continues to blur the 
distinction between organized crime groups and 
ultranationalists in the minds of the Japanese citizenry.51 The 
reasons that the yakuza gangs were willing to join forces with 
the ultranationalists were because they both: (1) resented 
foreigners; (2) hated liberalism and socialism; (3) revered a 
romanticized past; (4) deified the emperor; and (5) organized 
along the rigid oyabun-kobun system.52 Additionally, the 
emergence of a political left-wing and labor movement at the 
turn of the century, which threatened the basis of yakuza 
power, made the yakuza gangs easy converts to 
ultranationalism. 
Thus, began an era of yakuza cooperation with the 
ultranationalists. So successful was· the ultranationalist 
movement that many members were elected to national office, 
and it was these people who led Japan into World War II. 
During the period leading up to World War II, the numerous 
yakuza and ultranationalist gangs continued to contribute men 
and muscle to the patriotic cause. For example, yakuza groups 
went to occupied Manchuria and China to participate in "land 
development" programs and to assist in the Japanese Opium 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 35. 
51. Id. 
52.Id. 
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Monopoly Bureau, whose job it was to raise money and weaken 
public resistance through drug addiction.53 
Aside from their political aspirations, the yakuza groups were 
busy expanding their business activities back home in Japan. 
Military expansion had brought enormous amounts of money 
into Japan, and the yakuza were posturing to grab a large 
share of the money. For example, in the port city of Kobe, 
yakuza gangs gathered up groups of otherwise unemployable 
and unskilled people and sold them for cheap labor to the 
longshore fIrms in need of labor. 54 
However, with the onset of World War II, most yakuza gangs 
were weakened in power or eliminated altogether because 
yakuza members were required either to join the military or go 
to prison. 55 
After World War II, with Japan in ruins and the yakuza gangs 
in disarray, it was ultimately the American Occupational 
Forces who would, directly and indirectly, contribute to the 
rebirth of the yakuza. For example, while the Government 
Section of the Occupational Forces was trying to eliminate the 
yakuza altogether, U.S. military intelligence officials were 
secretly aiding the yakuza and ultranationalists in order to 
suppress a perceived threat of growing communism.56 For 
example, the yakuza were used for strike-breaking and attacks 
on leftist leaders.57 Additionally, policies of food-rationing 
helped perpetuate the black market which was supplied by 
American soldiers and which, as a result, brought many gangs 
wealth and power. 58 In essence, the black market in foodstuffs 
did for the yakuza what prohibition did for the U.S. MafIa. 
Finally, the complete disarming of the civilian police force 
53. [d. at 38. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 39. 
56. [d. at 44. 
57. [d. at 62. 
58. [d. 
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allowed the yakuza gangs to essentially operate unhindered by 
lawenforcement.59 
One noted event that happened during the occupation period, 
which reestablished strong ties between the yakuza and the 
police and which probably contributed to some future police 
and societal tolerance of the yakuza, happened in the city of 
Kobe.60 A group of sangokujin (people of three countries) 
consisting of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans held several 
policemen hostage. The mayor of Kobe approached the 
Yamaguchi-gumi yakuza group for help. The yakuza ambushed 
the sangokujin and resolved the incident. The yakuza's reward 
for this act was twofold: (1) the hated sangokujin were routed; 
and (2) the police owed the yakuza a long-term debt of giri 
(duty or obligation).61 The Kobe incident is considered by the 
yakuza to be a great patriotic stand, because they were saving 
Japan from foreigners and; it was, once again, the yakuza as 
champions of the common people. 
2. Creation of the Gurentai 
During the occupation a new type of yakuza group was forming 
called the gurentai (hoodlums).62 The gurentai groups operated 
through the use of threat, extortion, and violence. 
Additionally, these groups were far more ruthless and violent 
than the bakuto and tekiya gangs.63 Finally, the gurentai were 
also not above using violence and extortion against the common 
people, which violated the long unwritten code of the bakuto 
and tekiya gangs not to commit acts of violence against the 
citizens. 
59. [d. at 44. 
60. [d. at 48. 
61. [d. 
62. Frank F. Y. Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese 
Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988, 2 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 19, 25 
(1992). 
63. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 49. 
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3. Yoshio Kodama 
Perhaps the most important thing the American Occupational 
Forces did, which eventually gave the yakuza unprecedented 
political power, was to release from prison a Class A war 
criminal named Y oshio Kodama. Kodama was released from 
prison due to a combination of two . factors. First, the 
Occupational Forces feared that communism would spread to 
Japan, and Kodama had connections within the criminal 
underworld and the government to suppress that perceived 
threat. More importantly, however, was the coming to power of 
the communists in China, and the Americans' need for someone 
who had previously operated in China and who had an 
extensive intelligence network there. That man was Yoshio 
Kodama. As a result, Kodama became one of the most 
powerful men in postwar Japan, and he also became the 
yakuza's link to the highest levels of Japanese government. 
Kodama's activities before and during World War II made him 
a very wealthy individual, and he used that money after his 
release from prison to finance the founding of the Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP) which controlled the Japanese 
Government until the early 1990'S.64 
Kodama was a ultranationalist and a kuromaku (black curtain 
puller), in other words, an individual who operated behind the 
scenes influencing government policy.65 Kodama helped 
N obusuke Kishi, also a war criminal, to become the Prime 
Minister of Japan in 1957, and he also helped Bamboku Ohno 
to become Secretary General of the LDP in 1963.66 These three 
people helped to return many prewar rightists and yakuza 
allies to the center stage of power in Japan. 
Kodama's actions also gave the yakuza some measure of official 
legitimacy. For example, in 1960, with the increase of leftist 
demonstrations in Japan and the impending visit of President 
Eisenhower, whose trip was later canceled, Prime Minister 
64. [d. at 67. 
65. [d. at 78. 
66. [d. at 82. 
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Kishi and Kodama enlisted the aid of the yakuza and 
established a 40,000 man force to quell the demonstrations and 
to protect Ike's safety.67 Additionally, in the 1960's, Kodama 
even tried to establish one unified yakuza group consisting of 
all the most powerful yakuza syndicates called the Kanto-kai; 
however, the organization disbanded fifteen months after it 
was created.68 . 
In 1972, Kodama also helped to end a long feud between two of 
the most powerful yakuza syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi and 
the Inagawa-kai, by arranging an alliance between the two 
groupS.69 This alliance was extremely powerful as only four 
Japanese prefectures escaped the influence of the two 
syndicates.7o 
Therefore, from 1960 to the mid-1970's, Yoshio Kodama, and 
the groups he represented - from the right-wing thugs, to the 
yakuza syndicates, and to his minions in the government -
had reached the summit of power. Kodama had an army of 
rightists and gangsters at his disposal, millions of dollars in his 
pockets, and a corrupt and complicit government. As a result, 
the underworld's kuromaku and power-broker had become the 
most powerful man in Japan and, as a result, the yakuza 
syndicates were tapped into the highest levels of Japanese 
government. 
However, in 1976, this power structure came to an end. 
Kodama, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, and other high 
government officials were toppled from power amid revelations 
of approximately $12 million in illegal payoffs from the 
. Lockheed corporation, which were paid since the 1950's to 
secure airplane sales contracts from the Japanese 
government.71 As a side note, the Lockheed scandal prompted 
67. [d. at 85. 
68. [d. at 94. 
69. [d. at 98. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 102. 
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the U.S. Congress to enact the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 which prohibits overseas bribes by U.S. corporations.72 
Based on the Lockheed revelations Kodama was arrested and 
charges filed against him in 1981, and without ever going to 
jail Kodama died in 1984.73 Thus ended the era of one of the 
most, if not the most, powerful man in postwar Japan. 
4. After the Occupation Years 
As Japan recovered from defeat and destruction, the yakuza 
were forced to move from control of necessities to control of 
luxuries, such as gambling, professional sports, entertainment, 
prostitution, and drugs.74 Additionally, many of the yakuza 
members quit their life of crime for legitimate sources of 
income; however, a large number of them stayed and formed 
the core of the new yakuza syndicates who continued to gain 
enormous wealth and power. 
The structure and operations of the yakuza began to change 
after the war as well. The yakuza were becoming more violent, 
the use of firearms increased, and common people were now 
being subjected to robberies and shakedowns, all of which 
violated the yakuza's unwritten code.75 Additionally, 
syndicates began to enlarge to thousands of members who were 
overseen by dozens of sub-oyabuns, and the larger syndicates 
began to absorb the smaller ones.76 Furthermore, the 
syndicates no longer consisted of just one type of yakuza group, 
rather they were an amalgam of tekiya, bakuto, and gurentai 
groupS.77 
Although the police cracked down on the yakuza syndicates 
from time to time during the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, many 
high officials in the ruling party (LDP) were less concerned 
72. [d. at 114. 
73. Id. at 113. 
74. [d. at 76. 
75. [d. at 90. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
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with the day-to-day operations of the yakuza and were more 
interested in forming alliances with them.78 The yakuza gangs 
played an essential role in helping many politicians shape their 
political careers through the help of such people as Yoshio 
Kodama. 
Although the death of Yoshio Kodama resulted in the loss of a 
powerful connection to the Japanese government for the 
yakuza, questionable payments and underworld connections, 
although less obvious, still stretch far and wide among Japan's 
elected officials at the local and national levels. For example, 
in the Sagawa Kyubin scandal, it was revealed that yakuza 
syndicates were involved in the selection of Prime Minister 
Noboru Takeshita in 1987.79 Furthermore, the yakuza today 
are employed in Japanese politics as fund raisers, bodyguards, 
and campaign workers and in return, the yakuza bosses gain 
access to many of the nation's leading politicians.so Finally, 
these politicians, through yakuza pressure, have delayed many 
regulatory reforms in yakuza-dominated industries such as 
money lending and private guard services.8 ! 
In the early 1970's, the yakuza, capitalizing on their dominance 
in Japan, started expanding overseas, first targeting Korea, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and the rest of the Pacific Rim, then 
Hawaii and the west coast of the United States, before moving 
in on the rest of North and South America. 
Then in the mid-1980's with the economic boon in Japan, the 
yakuza used cheap loans to invest heavily into legitimate areas, 
such as real estate and business, at home and abroad. 
Today, with the collapse of the "bubble economy" in Japan 
during the early 1990's, and the adoption of the 1992 Anti-gang 
law, the yakuza as a whole are changing by streamlining. 
through the absorption of the smaller syndicates into the larger 
78. Id. at 78. 
79. Robert Delfs, Smoking Gun; New Euidence Links Takeshita with Gangsters, 
155:48 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Dec. 3, 1992, at 18. 
80. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 116. 
81. Id. at 120. 
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syndicates, and by some members quitting crime altogether. 
However, the yakuza will continue to survive through 
adaptation and through their continued connections to high 
government officials. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, despite legal sanctions, police crackdowns, and 
scandal revelations, the yakuza syndicates are still entrenched 
in Japanese society, economy, and politics, and they have 
adapted their methods of operations and structure in order to 
thrive. More ominously for the rest of the world, they have also 
expanded their operations to parts of Southeast Asia, Europe, 
and North and South America. Furthermore, even with the 
Anti-gang law, the yakuza are still very much alive and well in 
Japan and abroad. 
In addition to the importance of knowing the history of the 
yakuza, understanding their organizational structure is equally 
important when it comes to developing ways to combat yakuza 
organized crime in Japan and abroad. 
III. YAKUZA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The yakuza organizational structure is very complex. For one 
thing, the yakuza enjoy some degree of public acceptance. As a 
result of this acceptance, suprisingly, at least up until 1992 
with the enactment of the Anti-gang law in Japan, the yakuza 
openly admitted who they were as each group had its own 
distinctive insignia inscribed onto lapel pins and flags.82 Gang 
members openly and proudly wore their lapel pins, and they 
also carried business cards which had their name, gang name, 
and rank printed on them.83 Furthermore, the gang insignia 
was displayed on their gang headquarters.84 Often on display 
also, inside gang headquarters, were photos of all the previous 
82. Linda L. Keene, Asian Organized Crime, 58:10 FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULL. 
13, 15 (Oct. 1989). 
83. RYAN, supra note 32, at 57. 
84. Keene, supra note 82, at 15. 
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godfathers of the organization, bottles containing the severed 
finger-tips of yakuza members, and a complex organizational 
chart which traced the group's ancestry back several 
generations.85 
Several of the largest syndicates even published their own 
newspapers or magazines complete with legal advice, 
photographs, announcements of initiation rites, jailings, prison 
releases and funerals, and moral guidelines.86 Some 
syndicates, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi, even offer benefits, 
such as retirement pay.87 
Additionally, the yakuza groups disguise themselves and their 
activities through the use of front companies or by claiming to 
be political or religious organizations.88 Also, to hide their 
activities, the yakuza will use archaic Japanese or heavy slang 
when they talk, so the police and citizens will not know what is 
being said.89 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Initially, as stated previously, each yakuza gang can itself be 
classified according to its historical background as a bakuto, 
tekiya, or gurentai gang.90 Additionally, while there is no one 
central administrating body governing the activities of all 
yakuza groups and while each yakuza gang is, theoretically, 
autonomous, most yakuza gangs join together to form 
syndicates with the largest and most powerful of the gangs at 
the top of the power structure.91 Furthermore, the syndicates 
are not comprised solely of the same type of gang, rather the 
syndicates are an amalgam of bakuto, tekiya, or gurentai gangs. 
85. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 142. 
86. [d. at 146. 
87. [d. at 137. 
88. Japan; Tycoons of Crime, ECONOMIST, Feb. 29, 1992, at 36, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis NEWS Library, ECON File. 
89. ROME, supra note 1, at 214. 
90. WILLIAM CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN JAPAN 120 (1976). 
91. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215. 
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Two types of organizational structures exist in the yakuza 
syndicates. The first structural type is a pyramidal power 
structure which is followed by the two largest syndicates in 
Japan: the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Inagawa-kai.92 The 
second structural type is a federation or conglomerate 
structure which is followed by the Sumiyoshi-rengo syndicate.93 
1. Pyramidal Structure 
The pyramidal structure type, which is based on feudal power 
structures, is the traditional structure of the yakuza with 
enormous power vested in the godfather of the syndicate. At 
the top of the pyramid is the godfather or kumicho (supreme 
chief) of the syndicate.94 Under the kumicho rule a group of 
usually four shatei (younger brothers). Next follows a group of 
eight directors called wakashira-hosa (assistant young leaders), 
one of whom will be appointed a wakashira (young leader). 
The shatei, wakashira, and wakashira-hosa function as a board 
of directors who meet monthly and decide on syndicate policy 
and divide up the syndicate's income, accordingly.95 A senior 
consultative group called the sanro-kai, which dispenses advice 
on whatever matters are presented it, also exists.96 Below this 
hierarchy lies a series of lesser offices: one kambuatsu-kai 
(executive), and several wakashu (young men), who each 
command their own legions of kobun (children) or kumi-in 
(enlisted men}.97 In addition, there are large numbers of 
apprentices and fringe persons who are connected to the 
syndicate. Within each individual gang of the syndicate, there 
exists a maze of similar relationships all based on the oyabun-
kobun system.98 
92. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 30. 
93. [d. at 32. 
94. Honourable Mob, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1990, at 19, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
. NEWS Library, ECON File. 
95. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 132. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
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Within the syndicate each individual gang is required to issue 
an annual financial report and to send monthly payments to 
syndicate headquarters.99 Furthermore, within each individual 
gang, a similar system of tribute operates where the kobun are 
required to make monthly payments to their oyabun. Finally, 
payments are also made on New Years as gifts, for funerals, 
and when a member is released from prison.1OO 
2. Federation Structure 
The federation structure is a new type of corporate 
management system which is used by the Sumiyoshi-rengo 
syndicate. The distribution of power is characterized by a 
federation of gang bosses, sharing equal authority and power, 
who select a kumicho from among the group members.IOI 
Although the federation kumicho serves as a unifying force, his 
power is less absolute than that of a kumicho in a pyramid 
structure syndicate, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi, and, 
consequently, more autonomy lies with the individual gangs of 
the federation. lo2 
Like the pyramid structured syndicates, each individual gang 
is required to pay monthly tribute to the syndicate; however, 
the amount is less because of the equal authority of the bosses 
at the top of the federation. loa Within each individual gang, a 
similar system of tribute also operates where the kobun are 
required to make monthly payments to their oyabun. Finally, 
like the pyramid structured syndicates, the syndicates will 
make payments to individual members as New Year's gifts, for 
funerals, and for being released from prison. 
99. [d. at 132. 
100. [d. 
101. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 30. 
102. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 140. 
103. [d. 
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B. RECRUITS, APPRENTICES, AND INITIATION 
The yakuza syndicates usually draw one-third of their recruits 
from the bosozoku (hot-rodder) youth motorcycle gangs.104 The 
yakuza also recruit vast numbers of people from two groups 
that have suffered relentless discrimination in modern Japan: 
(1) the ethnic Koreans living in Japan; and (2) the burakumin -
members of Japan's ancestral untouchable class.105 It is 
estimated that roughly 70 percent of yakuza members are of 
burakumin origin. lOS The reasons these three groups are 
attracted to the yakuza are: (1) the offering of a surrogate 
family; (2) provision of a vehicle for upward social mobility; and 
(3) the sense of belonging to a group, which is all-important in 
Japan.107 
The new recruits are initiated into the yakuza group through a 
ceremony, which will be discussed in detail later, that involves 
the exchange of sake cups with the oyabun in the presence of a 
third person. lOS Furthermore, the recruit takes a seihai-gishiki, 
or oath of alliance, to verify his trustworthiness.109 Finally, the 
initiate swears to obey the basic tenets of the yakuza: "(1) 
never reveal the secrets of the organization; (2) never violate 
the wife or children of another member; (3) no personal 
involvement with narcotics; (4) do not withhold money from the 
gangs; (5) do not fail in obedience to superiors; and (6) do not 
appeal to the police or law."110 
Next, the new recruits will normally spend the next six to 
twelve months as sanshita (apprentices).11l During the 
apprentice stage, the new recruits will be on 24 hour call for six 
days and nights per week, and they will perform tasks such as 
104. Joachim Kersten, Street Youths, Bosozoku, and Yakuza: Subculture Forma-
tion and Societal Reactions in Japan, 39:3 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 277, 288 (July 
1993). 
105. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 145. 
106. Thorton & Endo, supra note 14, at 172. 
107. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 146. 
lOB. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215. 
109. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33. 
110. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 141. 
111. ROME, supra note 1, at 9B. 
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cooking, cleaning, answering telephones, serving guests, and 
chauffeuring. 112 
To ensure the loyalty of gang members and to bond them 
together, the modem yakuza syndicates have also adopted 
rituals, ceremonies, and values from the traditional Japanese 
society and from early yakuza groups. 
C. RITUALS, V ALVES, AND CUSTOMS 
1. Oyabun-Kobun System 
Perhaps the single most cohesive force that binds the yakuza 
members together is the oyabun-kobun system (parent 
role/child role), which has continued to exist since feudal times 
in business and government in modem J apan.113 In this 
system, the oyabun provide' food, clothing, shelter, protection, 
advice, and help for their kobun, who in return, owe labor, 
unswerving loyalty, and unquestioning obedience to their 
bosses.114 For example, an innocent kobun would be expected 
to go to prison for a crime committed by his oyabun.ll5 
Within the early yakuza groups, this system created great 
strength and cohesion and at times would even lead to 
fanatical devotion to the oyabun. Today, the oyabun-kobun 
relationship continues to foster loyalty, obedience, and trust 
among theyakuza, despite the modernization of Japan. 
Additionally, what helps the oyabun-kobun system to thrive 
are the concepts ofgiri and ninjo. 
2. Giri and Ninjo 
The yakuza, particularly the early yakuza groups, follow, to 
some degree, the values embodied in bushido, the code of the' 
samurai. Like the samurai, the yakuza would prove their 
112. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 143. 
113. ROME, supra note 1, at 20. 
114. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33. 
115. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 19. 
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manliness by the stoic endurance of pain, hunger, and 
imprisonment, and violent death for the yakuza was an 
honorable fate.us But at the heart of the yakuza's and 
Japanese society's values, which bind people together, lie the 
concepts ofgiri and ninjo. 
Giri means "obligation or a strong sense of duty, and is tied up 
with complex Japanese values involving loyalty, gratitude, and 
moral debt. "117 In a sense, giri is the social cloth that binds 
much of Japan together, and its observance plays a central role 
in the oyabun-kobun system. 
Ninjo roughly means "human feeling" or "emotion. "U8 Among 
its many interpretations is "generosity or sympathy toward the 
weak and disadvantaged, and empathy toward others. "U9 
By adopting giri-ninjo, the yakuza enhanced their standing in 
society, showing that, like the samurai, they could combine 
compassion and kindness with their martial skills. 
According to Kakuji Inagawa, former head of the Inagawa-kai, 
"the yakuza are trying to pursue the road of chivalry and 
patriotism. That's our biggest difference with the American 
Mafia, it's our sense of giri-ninjo. The yakuza try to take care 
of all society if possible, even if it takes one million yen to help 
a single person. "120 
But, in reality, the yakuza claims that they follow giri-ninjo 
may be nothing more than a smokescreen to legitimize 
themselves with the people of Japan. For example, in the Kobe 
earthquake of 1995, the Yamaguchi-gumi syndicate distributed 
free food for the victims, but in return, the syndicate wanted 
the people to give them written testimonials saying how good 
116. [d. at 28. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 29. 
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they were so they could get construction contracts.l21 
Furthermore, police believe the yakuza harassed businesses 
into giving them the food free or at a discount.l22 
The yakuza are also bound together by other values. 
3. Other Values 
The yakuza also appear to be bound together by adherence to a 
special code of conduct involving kao (face), otoko (masculinity), 
and ikka (whole family).l23 Maintaining kao is important to 
commanding respect and keeping one's status within the gang; 
proving otoko is a crucial element of bravado of the members; 
and treating other members as family provides ikka and helps 
bind the members together.124 According to some scholars, ikka 
is one of the most important values because it provides a stable 
base for the quasi-family structure of the yakuza where 
everyone has a defined role.l25 
4. Discipline 
Yakuza groups deal severely with those who break the gang's 
rules. Cowardice, disobedience, and revealing gang secrets are 
treated not only as acts of betrayal, but also as affronts to the 
reputation and honor of the gang. 126 The punishment, 
depending on the nature of the offense, ranges from simply 
bowing your head and making a humble apology all the way to 
execution. 127 Short of death, the worst punishment is 
expulsion.l28 After expelling the member, the boss notifies 
other yakuza bosses that the member is no longer welcome in 
his group, and by general agreement, the outcast could not join 
121. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Quake that Hurt Kobe Helps its Criminals, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 1995, at A3. 
122. [d. 
123. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25. 
127. ROME, supra note 1, at 97. 
128. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25. 
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a rival gang.129 For serious violations not warranting death or 
expulsion, the member is subjected to yubitsume, a 'custom 
introduced by the early bakuto gangs, in which the top joint of 
the little fmger is ceremoniously self-amputated as an act of 
contrition.130 Mer the portion of the finger is self-amputated, 
the member wraps it in a silk cloth and solemnly hands it to 
the oyabun.131 Further infractions could mean another 
amputation at the second joint of the same finger or at the top 
joint of another finger.132 Today, approximately 42 percent of 
yakuza have had fingers cut off.l33 
5. Tattooing 
The other identifying characteristic of the yakuza, the tattoo, 
was introduced by the early bakuto gangs during Japan's 
feudal period. In feudal times, the tattoo appeared as a mark 
of punishment, and criminals were generally tattooed with one 
black ring around the arm for each offense.l34 As suppression 
by the ruling class touched villagers who were not criminals, 
tattooing became a symbol of resistance to despotism.l35 
Because it was such a test of strength to endure the pain of 
tattooing, it began to take on other aspects, such as manliness, 
courage, health, and vitality, and the early yakuza felt 
themselves to be the possessors of such attributes.13S Over the 
years the patterns grew more complex, blending an array of 
famous gods, folk heroes, animals, and flowers into one fluid 
design and; by the late 17th century intricate, full-body designs 
became popular with the bakuto.137 Tattooing eventually 
spread to the tekiya gangs, and today, approximately 73 
percent of yakuza have some form of tattoos.l38 
129. [d. 
130. ROME, supra note 1, at 97. 
131. [d. 
132. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25. 
133. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 34. 
134. ROME, supra note 1, at 54. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. 
137. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 26. 
138. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 34. 
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6. Sakazuki-shiki 
One type of ritual performed by the yakuza is sakazuki-shiki or 
the ritual exchange of sake CUpS.139 The sake ceremony is used 
to initiate new recruits and symbolize blood connections; to 
represent entry into the oyabun-kobun relationship; to 
consummate the appointment of a new godfather of a 
syndicate; and to bind alliances with other yakuza 
syndicates.14o The ceremony also holds religious significance, 
typically being performed on a sambo (altar) before a Shinto 
shrine.141 Additionally, the amount of sake in the cups depends 
upon one's status. For example, if participants are brother and 
brother, as in treaties between gang bosses, equal amounts are 
poured into each cup, and if the relationship is between oyabun 
and kobun, the oyabun's cup is filled six-tenths and the kobun's 
four-tenths. 142 
An example of an entire formal sake exchange ceremony 
between oyabun and kobun is described by criminologist 
Hiroaki Iwai: " ... all members of the ikka [are required to] 
attend, with the torimochinin (the go-between; the arranger) or 
azukarinin (sponsor, guarantor of the initiate) present as 
intermediaries. Rice, fish, salt, and sake are placed in the 
Shinto shrine alcove when the ceremony begins. The oyabun 
first drinks and then turns his cup to the kobun. The kobun 
who is being admitted into the organization drinks from the 
same cup. The torimochinin warns of the solemn duties of the 
kobun: "As long as you carry this cup, you must be loyal to the 
ikka and serve your oyabun with filial piety. Even if your wife 
and children starve, you must work for the oyabun and the 
ikka at the risk of your life. Your duty now is to live with this 
relationship for life. Consider the oyabun as your eternal 
father. Do not fearwater or fire, and volunteer to undertake 
every difficult task. "143 
139. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 98. 
140. [d. at 20. 
141. [d. at 19. 
142. [d. 
143. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215. 
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If the ceremony was to appoint a new godfather of the 
syndicate, after the sake cup exchange, the new oyabun would 
be presented a flag with the syndicate's insignia embroidered 
on it, a roll of silk, a traditional scroll of blank white paper, and 
a sword. l44 
Such ceremonies continue today; however, they are usually 
abbreviated in form. 
7. Demukai 
Another type of ceremony the yakuza used was the demukai or 
prison-release ceremony.145 The ceremony consisted of 
hundreds of syndicate members lining up according to gang, 
sub-gang, and personal rank at the prison gate, and after the 
member was released a celebration would be held in his honor. 
Additionally, the released member was also given a promotion 
for doing time for the syndicate. The ceremony was an 
important rite of passage for the yakuza member, because it 
was a symbol that the state's rehabilitation efforts had 
failed. 146 
Today, these elaborate and extravagant prison-release 
ceremonies have been toned down or discontinued altogether 
because they began to anger the public and drew too much 
police attention to the yakuza. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the structure of the yakuza syndicates is a 
complex system consisting of feudal and traditional oaths, 
values, rituals, and personal relationships, and while these 
aspects are still embraced by the modern yakuza, as time goes 
on, these traditions are becoming less important - taking a 
backseat to the all-encompassing pursuit of money. 
144. ROME, supra note 1, at 150. 
145. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 152. 
146. [d. 
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Because Japan is where the vast majority ofyakuza syndicates 
operate, it is important to understand how organized crime is 
structured in Japan. 
N. STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAPAN 
At the peak of their power in 1963, the yakuza syndicates 
consisted of 184,109 members in 5,216 separate gangs.147 
Today, in Japan, there are approximately 88,000 to 90,000 
membersl48 in some 3,300 ~eparate gangs.149 Of this number, 
75 percent are members of sixteen yakuza syndicates.15o 
However, some officials estimate that there may be as many as 
ten times that number of other criminal associates.151 
Members of the three largest yakuza syndicates in Japan, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi, the Inagawa-kai, and the Sumiyoshi-rengo, 
account for 65 percent of the total number of yakuza 
members.152 
The Yamaguchi-gumi is the largest and most powerful yakuza 
syndicate in Japan. Current estimates put their numbers at 
30,000 members153 in some 944 gangs throughout Japan.l54 
Furthermore, the Yamaguchi-gumi is made up of members 
from all three of Japan's traditional gangster classes - bakuto, 
tekiya, and gurentai. 155 
147. Takashi Kakimi, Organized Crime in Japan: The Boryokudan Groups, 55:10 
POLICE CHIEF 161 (Oct. 1988). 
148. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, JAPAN ECON. 
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File. 
149. Japanese Mobsters Hard Pressed to Adapt to New Law, AGENCE FRANCE-
PREssE, June 3,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File. 
150. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, supra note 148. 
151. Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein, Japanese Gangsters Launder Money in 
U.S., OREGONIAN, Jan. 27,1993, at B9, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN Data-
base. 
152. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, supra note 148. 
153. Quake Spells Profits for Crime Groups, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 
1995, at AS, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 3291964. 
154. Banks Extend Loans to Yamaguchi-gumi Gang, Paper Says, JAPAN ECON. 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File. 
155. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 147. 
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The Yamaguchi-gumi's influence spreads to all regions of 
Japan; however, their headquarters are located in the port city 
of Kobe. A large proportion of their operations take place 
behind the front company called the Association of Harbor 
Stevedoring Promotions.156 Throughout Japan, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi is heavily involved in the construction and 
cargo industry through outright ownership of firms to hiring 
out day laborers. They are also involved in money laundering, 
smuggling, pornography, counterfeiting, extortion, prostitution, 
sex slave trade, gambling, loan-sharking, and the control of 
thousands of street-stall operators. Additionally, they are tied 
into professional sports, such as boxing and sumo wrestling. 
The Yamaguchi-gumi also controls much of the entertainment 
industry from talent agencies and booking firms to the movie 
companies themselves. But the majority of their illegal income 
is derived from the sale of narcotics, especially amphetamines. 
The Yamaguchi-gumi also derives income from legitimate 
sources including real estate, video games, golf courses, 
trucking, waste disposal, security services, bath houses, 
restaurants, bars, hospitals, English schools, amusement 
parlors, and overseas investment. However, it is quite 
probable that these businesses were purchased with "dirty" 
money and may be front companies which hide other illegal 
operations. 
In all, it is estimated that the Yamaguchi-gumi controls "7,000 
shops, 5,000 restaurants, 4,500 money-laundering operations, 
2,300 bath houses, 2,500 bars, 600 property companies and 400 
transport firms."157 
The Inagawa-kai, at last estimate in 1984, consisted of 4,347 
members in 119 gangs.l58 Unlike the Yamaguchi-gumi, the 
156. ld. at 92. 
157. Keith Stafford, Japanese Gangs Extend Their Criminal Tentacles Worldwide, 
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 13, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, 
ALLWLD File. 
158. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 139. 
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majority of Inagawa-kai members are of strictly bakuto 
stock. l59 
The Inagawa-kai has headquarters located in Tokyo and 
Yokohama, and their sphere of influence consists of the eastern 
region of Japan. The main source of income for the Inagawa-
kai comes from gambling activities such as bookmaking, 
organizing off-shore gambling tours, and running high stakes 
casinos and card games. They are also heavily involved in 
loan-s~arking, overseas investment, money-laundering, gun-
running, extortion, prostitution, sex slave trade, and narcotics. 
According to a 1979 police estimate, the Inagawa-kai also ran 
879 legitimate businesses, such as construction and 
entertainment companies, bars, cabarets, golf courses, and 
restaurants. lSO 
The second most powerful yakuza syndicate is the Sumiyoshi-
rengo. At last estimate in 1984, the Sumiyoshi-rengo consisted 
of 6,723 members in 113 gangs, and the majority of those 
members were· of bakuto stock.l6l . The Sumiyoshi-rengo is 
headquartered in Tokyo, and its sphere of influence extends to 
the entire eastern region of Japan.l62 Their "business" 
activities are relatively consistent with those of the Inagawa-
kai and Yamaguchi-gumi. 
Since the early 1970's, these yakuza, in general, and these 
three syndicates, in particular, have expanded their operations 
overseas. For example, they now have operations in: (1) South 
America, Brazil, in particular; (2) the Philippines; (3) Thailand; 
(4) Europe; (5) Russia; (6) China; (7) Australia; (8) South 
Mrica; (9) Taiwan; (10) Korea; and (11) the United States. 
In the United States, for example, the yakuza are involved in 
money-laundering, extortion, prostitution, gun smuggling, drug 
smuggling, gambling, enticing women for the sex slave trade, 
and corporate and real estate investments. Additionally, the 
159. ld. at 148. 
160. ld. 
161. ld. at 139. 
162. ld. at 140. 
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yakuza are believed to be linked to smuggling operations that 
supply an estimated 90 percent of the crystal 
methamphetamine that is available in Hawaii.l63 
Furthermore, authorities have traced $500 million worth of 
assets in the United States, and, in Hawaii, alone, more than 
50 properties ranging from golf clubs to office buildings are 
owned by yakuza members.l64 
While the yakuza syndicates carry out the bulk of their 
criminal activities by themselves, they will also form alliances 
to prevent turf wars and to do business together. These 
alliances may be temporary and for only one purpose, such as 
drug smuggling, or they may be on a relatively permanent 
basis and for all business activities. The syndicates will also 
form strategic alliances with organized crime groups of 
different ethnicity. For example, the yakuza have formed 
alliances with the powerful Hong Kong and Taiwan Chinese 
Triads for the purposes of trafficking heroin, amphetamines, 
migrant workers, and women and children for the sex slave 
trade. Is5 Additionally, the yakuza have established ties with 
the Russian Mafia for the purposes of gun smuggling.l66 
Finally, the yakuza have established links with the American 
Mafia for the purposes of gun smuggling, gambling, and 
coordinating and fmancing drug smuggling operations.ls7 
In conclusion, the yakuza syndicates have controlled crime and 
have affected the operations of legitimate businesses in Japan 
since the turn of the century due to their code of silence and 
corruption and infiltration of government, law enforcement, 
. and the judicial system. With the yakuza expanding their 
operations overseas, foreign law enforcement officials need to 
163. Karl Schoenberger, Japanese Gangsters Act To Penetrate U.S. Areas; Crime: 
The Syndicates Are Moving Across America, Shifting Their Emphasis from Gambling, 
Prostitution to Real Estate and Corporate Investment, L.A TIMES, Jan. 4,1992, at AlB, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File. 
164. ANToNIO NICASO & LEE LAMOTHE, GLOBAL MAFIA: THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
OF ORGANIZED CRIME 94 (1995). 
165. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 213. 
166. Russian, Japanese Gangs Link Up, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 11, 1992, at 3, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis WORU> Library, ALLWLD File. 
167. NICASO, supra note 164, at 93. 
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become familiar with the yakuza's organizational structure and 
operations and develop prevention methods accordingly. 
V. BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE YAKUZA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The yakuza syndicates are involved in a wide variety of 
"business" operations, some legitimate and others criminal. 
The estimated total income for the yakuza syndicates as a 
whole is anywhere from $10 billion to $71 billion.l68 The 
legitimate operations of the yakuza will be discussed first, and 
the criminal operations last. 
B. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
Particularly since the 1980's, the yakuza have invested in a 
vast number of legitimate enterprises in Japan and abroad. 
The National Police Agency in Japan reports that the yakuza 
control over 25,000 legitimate businesses in Japan alone, in 
addition to their countless illegal ones.l69 These investments 
and businesses include golf courses and country clubs, the 
stock market, real estate firms, banks, gift shops, bars, 
restaurants, night clubs, theaters, construction and demolition 
firms, security services, hospitals, pachinko parlors, trucking, 
hotels, waste disposal, travel agencies, and many others. The 
problem with these legitimate businesses is that while a major 
portion of their income is legitimate, the businesses are often 
merely fronts for the yakuza syndicates' criminal operations. 
Furthermore, money derived from illicit sources is often 
laundered through these legitimate businesses. 
Today, the yakuza are reclassifying their operations as 
religious and political organizations, and as legitimate 
168. Velisarios Kattoulas, Japan's Mob Closes in on Global Underworld Crown, 
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, 
CURNWS File. 
169. DENNIS J. KENNEY & JAMES O. FINCKENAUER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 
262 (1995). 
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companies; however, these organizations are also used as 
fronts to disguise their criminal activities and income. 
In summary, although the yakuza are technically involved in 
legitimate businesses and derive some of their income from 
them, they "earn" most of their income from illegitimate 
sources. 
C. CRIMINAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
1. Introduction 
Since the 17th century, the yakuza have been involved in 
traditional types of organized crime such as protection rackets, 
street stall operators, prostitution, illegal gambling, extortion, 
loansharking, narcotics, and labor racketeering. Since the late 
1940's, the yakuza have expanded their operations. Now, they 
are also involved in: (1) controlling the construction business 
and the entertainment industry; (2) counterfeiting Japanese 
currency and stamps, United States dollars, watches, and even 
brand-name food products; (3) the sex slave trade; (4) 
smuggling immigrant workers, drugs, guns, whale meat, and 
other items; (5) insurance fraud; (6) corporate extortion; (7) 
strong-armed settlement of civil disputes between creditors and 
defaulting debtors and between parties involved in auto 
accidents; and (8) intimidation of landowners. 
In essence, the yakuza are the driving force behind virtually all 
crime that is committed in Japan, and their operations have an 
impact on legitimate businesses and industry in Japan as well. 
Today, the yakuza's dealings in counterfeiting, narcotics, the 
sex slave trade, and financial crimes affect not only Japan and 
expatriate Japanese around the world, but they are also 
affecting the rest of the world. 
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2. Sarakin 
Sarakin, which literally means "salary man financiers" are, in 
other words, 10ansharks.170 The sarakin industry has heavy 
gangster overtones. Loansharking involves the loaning of a 
certain amount of money at usurious interest rates, and, in 
addition, the borrower has to pay the loan back in an extremely 
short amount of time. If the individual cannot make the 
payments, he or she could be beaten up; however, the power of 
the sarakin is based on far more than the threat of violence.l7l 
Harassment and threats are a secondary concern· to the 
Japanese. Rather, they fear the sarakin's ability to cause them 
to lose face - a concept which is all important in Japan. For 
example, sarakin have charged into individuals' wakes and 
demanded that the widow payor they would disrupt the 
funeral, or they have sent express-mailing "reminders" of 
money to the debtor's children in care of their schools.172 This 
loss of face displayed before the public has pushed some 
Japanese to quit work, abandon their families, commit suicide 
and even murder. 
In the mid-1980's, government officials estimated there were 
42,000 sarakin firms operating in Japan.173 These loan sharks 
were largely successful because, until the mid-1980's, Japan's 
mainstream fmancial institutions shied away from granting 
consumer credit. However, the rapid expansion of commercial 
and consumer lending by Japanese banks in the 1980's has cut 
deeply into the sarakin market. But the Japanese banks . 
lacked sophisticated credit check systems, and, as a result, a lot 
of people defaulted on their loans. The result was that instead 
of writing off all the bad loans, the banks sold them to the 
yakuza. 174 In return, the banks would issue loans to the 
170. KAPLAN & DlJBRO, supra note 2, at 167. 
171. [d. at 168. 
172. [d. at 169. 
173. [d. at 167. 
174. Robert Delfs, Feeding on the System, 154:47 FARE. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1991, 
at 28,29. 
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yakuza several times larger than the size of the original bad 
debts. 175 
This practice of the banks giving the yakuza loans and getting 
them into the debt collection business is believed by many 
officials to be a major cause of Japan's fmancial troubles today. 
For example, of the $1 trillion or so in bad debts, officials 
estimate that anywhere from 10 to 70 percent of the loans are 
tainted by yakuza who are not repaying their debts.176 
Furthermore, since the yakuza were the major debt collectors 
for the banks, there were only a few legitimate collection 
agencies who could try to recover some of the bad debts. 
However, the banks and these collection agencies generally left 
the yakuza alone as they are afraid of violent retaliation by 
them. For example, in the past two years, a branch manager of 
Sumitomo Bank and a vice president of Hanwa bank have been 
shot to death.177 
In summary, although loansharking is less lucrative than it 
was in the economic boon of the 1980's, it still remains a source 
of yakuza income today. Furthermore, loansharking income 
has been supplemented by bad debt collection on behalf of 
financial institutions. 
3. Extortion and Intimidation 
The need for the Japanese to save face creates a unique climate 
in which a whole range of extortionist crimes can thrive. As 
much as gift-giving and giri contribute to the practice of 
bribery, these values also make the Japanese particularly 
vulnerable to blackmail, intimidation, and other related crimes. 
Extortion is an old and very common practice utilized by the 
yakuza, because it is easy to set up and enforce, and it is the 
175. [d. 
176. Sheryl WuDunn, Loan Problem's Dark Heart; Many Bad Debts Believed to 
Have a Mob Taint, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File. 
177. Jim Landers, Ex-police Chief Blames Gangs for Part of Japan's Economic 
Woes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1995, at D1, available in WESTLAW, ALL-
NEWS Database, File 1995 WL 9049586. . 
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means by which they can gain control over the streets and 
businesses and accumulate wealth and power. For example, in 
its simplest form, extortion is accomplished by having a couple 
. of yakuza members approach a proprietor of a business and 
advise him of a profit-sharing plan whereby they will "protect" 
the premises in return for a regular cut on the profits.178 Then 
the yakuza will give the proprietor a little time to think it over, 
but should he refuse, they will drop by for something called 
oreimairi, which literally means "to say thanks," but which 
translates into destroying the business and assaulting the 
proprietor. 179 
This type of extortion is particularly entrenched in certain lines 
of business called mizu shobai (water business), which consists 
of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs.1so In 1980, 70 percent of 
12,000 businesses, in this line of work in Yokohama alone, paid 
protection money in the amount of $6.5 million to the 
yakuza. 181 
In addition to this simple form of extortion, the yakuza have 
developed several more sophisticated types of extortion which 
it utilizes in Japan and abroad. 
a. Sokaiya 
One form of sophisticated extortion is corporate extortion by 
sokaiya (general meeting mongers).182 These white-collar 
gangsters known as sokaiya purchase a few shares of a 
company's stock and then they extort money from corporate 
executives in exchange for not asking embarrassing questions 
about scandalous information about the company's 
wrongdoings or about the executives themselves or otherwise 
disrupting annual stockholder meetings.l83 Sometimes these 
178. ROME, supra note 1, at 156. 
179. [d. 
180. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 169. 
181. [d. 
182. [d. at 170. 
183. Inami Shinnosuke, Going After the Yakuza, 39:3 JAPAN Q. 353, 356 (July-Sept. 
1992). 
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gangsters even accept payments for preventing other sokaiya· 
or legitimate shareholders from asking embarrassing questions 
or disrupting annual meetings.l84 The corporate executives are 
normally willing to payoff the sokaiya for fear of losing face 
before their employees and the public. The Japanese 
predilection for resolving disputes through personal and 
extralegal means, rather than through lawsuits, also provides 
an atmosphere for a preference of making the payments.l85 
Scams devised by the sokaiya are often very ingenious. For 
example, the Yamaguchi-gumi has set up a "financial research 
association" whose job it is to dig up as much dirt as possible on 
fmancial institutions and their executives which are located in 
their locality.l86 The group then uses the information to extort 
the money from the institution, and the pay-off will be 
extracted in the form of an irregular financing arrangement 
such as having a relative of the gang set up a dummy 
corporation which will be fmanced by the bank, and then the 
dummy corporation will declare bankruptcy.187 Another 
common method is for the sokaiya to pose as a publisher of a 
small magazine who will accept money for "subscriptions" and 
"advertising" in exchange for not printing scandalous stories.1SS 
The content of such stories is typically leaked to the company 
before the issue is distributed, and the company then buys all 
the copies of the issue at a premium price, often as high as 
$100 per issue.189 
Sokaiya profits fell rapidly after Japan's commercial code was 
revised in the early 1980's, making such payments illegal. 
However, the law merely forced the highly adaptive sokaiya 
into new ventures. For example, many have simply shifted 
184. Id. 
185. Richard McGregor, Japan Inc. 's Dirty Secret, 41:12 WORLD PREss REV. 40 
(Dec. 1994). 
186. Keiji Sakurada, Yakuza Storming the Corporate Ship, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, 
Apr. 1994, at 46, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, TOKBUS File. 
187. [d. 
188. Andrew Pollack, Japanese Weary of Sokaiya Today, Executives Have Been 
Killed as Extortionists are Becoming More Violent, FRESNO BEE, June 29, 1994, at C1, 
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL 8558596. 
189. [d. 
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gears and begun receiving payoffs from the overseas branches 
of targeted corporations, or by taking their gifts in commercial 
goods instead of cash.lOO Others have founded right-wing 
political groups disguising their payoffs as political 
contributions.191 
As a result, the sokaiya business is still alive and well. In a 
1991 survey, one-third of 2000 companies reported paying 
sokaiya annual amounts ranging up to 100 million yen.l92 
b. Jiageya 
Another type of intimidation and extortion the yakuza is 
involved in is inducing landowners and tenants to vacate land 
needed by real estate developers for new projects. This type of 
intimidation is carried out by yakuza members called jiageya 
(land raising specialists).193 One senior officer of a Japanese 
bank stated, "We neededjiage professionals because Japanese 
law favors the tenant. "194 
The jiageya racketeers operate by pressuring landowners 
through threats, vandalism, and violence to sell their property 
to them at a low price so that it can then be traded on Tokyo's 
speculative real estate market at a high price.195 
c. Mimbo 
A fmal type of yakuza extortion comes in the realm of mimbo 
(civil disputes).l96 Since many disputes are resolved by 
extralegal means, the yakuza provide a sort of "mediation" 
service in many disputes. The most common type of extortion 
involves the aftermath of car accidents, when one party will 
190. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 179. 
191. [d. 
192. Delfs, supra note 174, at 29. 
193. 'd. at 28. 
194. [d. 
195. Thorton & Endo, supra note 14, at 170. 
196. Kersten, supra note 104, at 290. 
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frequently hire a yakuza member to visit the other party.197 
The yakuza member will "suggest" that the person make a 
specified payment to settle the damages, and the· person 
generally pays, regardless of his actual responsibility in the 
accident.l98 Then the gangster takes a cut and delivers the rest 
to his client.199 
Another type of mimbo which has been discussed previously is 
financial institutions hiring yakuza members to collect loans 
from defaulting debtors. 
d. Conclusion 
In sum, the above described forms of blackmail, extortion, and 
intimidation are common practice among all yakuza syndicates 
today, and it generates them millions of dollars annually. 
Furthermore, it is a way for the yakuza to control the streets 
and gain access to the power base of the Japanese economy. 
4. Insurance Fraud 
The yakuza are also involved in murder-for-insurance schemes. 
First, the yakuza syndicate will intimidate a Japanese 
national, usually a businessman, in Japan into taking out a life 
insurance policy naming a yakuza member as the 
beneficiary.2oo Then the yakuza member will arrange for the 
victim to "win" a "competition" providing a free vacation to 
Manila in the Philippines, where the yakuza member hires an 
assassin for a couple of thousand dollars to kill the victim.201 
5. Gambling 
Gambling is a major source of revenue for the yakuza. For 
example, the yakuza run illegal bookie operations which take 
bets for legalized forms of racing such as horse racing, bike 
197. T.R. Reid, Japan's Police To Crack Down On Nation's Version Of Mafia, 
OREGONIAN, Feb. 29, 1992, at A4, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN Database. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. Stafford, supra note 157. 
201. [d. 
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racing, and speedboat racing.202 Additionally, the yakuza run 
street-level numbers rackets, high-stakes card games and 
casinos, and organize off-shore gambling tourS?03 
One example of how the yakuza operate is demonstrated by 
floating craps games, which is a game played with dice, whose 
locale is moved around from night to night to avoid police raids. 
The craps players will hang out in designated restaurants and 
nightclubs waiting for the message concerning the locale of the 
games. The word generally arrives through a yakuza member 
who gives a signal- a finger to his nose.204 The word for nose is 
the same as the word for flower, hana, and hana {uda, literally 
flower cards, is a favorite card game of the Japanese?05 
Finally, the yakuza are heavily involved in pachinko parlors, 
which are extremely popular in Japan. Because pachinko 
parlors are prohibited by law from giving cash prices, the 
winners get merchandise instead.206 The players Will usually 
take the merchandise to a nearby location to trade the 
merchandise for cash.207 The yakuza takes a portion of the 
profits from the pachinko parlors themselves and from th~ 
places which exchange the merchandise for cash.208 
Gambling has always been a traditional source of revenue for 
the yakuza and will continue to be in the future. 
6. Entertainment Industry 
The Japanese entertainment industry is also heavily controlled 
by the yakuza. For example, they own, manage, or control 
movie theaters, cabarets, talent agencies, booking firms, movie 
companies, and even the entertainers themselves?09 
Additionally, they receive revenue from ticket-scalping and 
202. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 77. 
203. [d. at 148. 
204. ROME, supra note 1, at 101. 
205. [d. 
206. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 35. 
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
209. ROME, supra note 1, at 107. 
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kickbacks from tradesmen, artisans, and suppliers of 
equipment.210 
Furthermore, the yakuza are tied into professional boxing and 
sumo wrestling. For example, the yakuza: (1) control the 
contracts of most the sumo wrestlers; (2) are the promoters of 
the matches; (3) control a major share of the ticket sales both 
legal and scalped; and (4) receive a portion of the 
concessions.211 
7. Labor 
Labor for the construction industry and longshoremen firms is 
largely controlled by the yakuza. The yakuza will furnish 
lodging and food and fmd unskilled laborers jobs for the day in 
exchange for a percentage of their day's wages.212 Then the 
yakuza generally try and get the rest of the laborers' money 
through prostitution, gambling, and drugs. 
Finally, the yakuza have a strong influence over labor unions, 
and they will generally, through violence, break any union 
strikes. 
8. Japanese Tourist Industry 
Due to the wealth of Japan, many Japanese have enough 
money to do extensive traveling around the world, and 
wherever they go, the yakuza are close behind. The yakuza 
control gift shops, tour agencies, nightclubs, and hotels in 
places all over the world where Japanese tourists frequently 
go. For example, in California, a common practice is for the 
yakuza to accost cash-laden Japanese tourists and, through 
deception or intimidation, force them to participate in selected 
tours.213 Additionally, the Japanese tourists are lured into 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 106. 
212. [d. at 69. 
213. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 257. 
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yakuza-controlled shops, and once inside the shop, they are 
intimidated into buying gifts at very high prices.214 
These same practices are carried out all over the world, and the 
Japanese victims rarely complain to the police for fear of 
retaliation and losing face among their fellow tourists. 
9. Construction Industry 
In addition to controlling the labor in the construction 
industry, the yakuza also own or control numerous construction 
and demolition firms throughout Japan. Theyakuza-controlled 
firms often get construction and demolition contracts through a 
system of bid rigging called dango.215 The yakuza are also 
known to disrupt the construction sites of rival companies 
unless they pay the yakuza a "greeting fee. "216 
The yakuza earn millions of dollars annually from their control 
of the construction industry, and with the destruction caused 
by the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the yakuza could earn billions of 
dollars from the rebuilding work. 
10. Smuggling 
The yakuza syndicates have smuggling operations which bring 
into Japan guns, drugs, sex slaves, migrant workers, and whale 
meat. This section will only discuss the smuggling of migrant 
workers and whale meat as the smuggling of drugs, guns, and 
sex slaves will be discussed in later sections. 
The yakuza are smuggling people from Thailand, the 
Philippines, Brazil, and China to work in Japan. For example, 
Chinese workers are smuggled into Japan by the yakuza 
through connections with Chinese Triad organized crime 
214. [d. at 258. 
215. Honourable Mob, supra note 94. 
216. Nicholas D. Kristof, Criminal Gangs Reap Millions from Kobe Reconstruction, 
SEATILE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 12, 1995, at A2, available in WESTLAW, ALL-
NEWS Database, File 1995 WL 4314979. 
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syndicates from Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan.217 The 
workers are smuggled into Japan in a variety of ways: (1) in 
boatloads of 100 to 150; (2) through the use of forged passports 
obtained from Indonesia and Taiwan; and (3) by spiriting 
Chinese travelers away from Japanese airports after they have 
obtained a one-day transit pass, which is obtained by showing 
immigration authorities they were en route to a third 
country.218 Most of these illegal workers are placed in jobs in: 
(1) restaurants and bars; (2) the construction industry; (3) 
metalworking; (4) printing; and (5) hotel kitchens?19 These 
people come to Japan for a better life, and they often spend 
years repaying the $25,000 it takes to smuggle them into 
Japan.220 Often, these illegal immigrants also live and work in 
miserable conditions, because they are always under the threat 
of being reported to the authorities if they do not obey their 
employers. 
The yakuza are also involved in the smuggling of whale meat 
into Japan. In Japan, whale meat is a delicacy that costs about 
$100 a plate, and the 300 minke whales killed legally each year 
do not satisfy the demand for it.221 Furthermore, a study was 
conducted which revealed that meat from protected whales 
that cannot be hunted legally such as the humpback whale, 
was being sold in Japanese supermarkets that were being 
supplied by the yakuza.222 This whale meat smuggling appears 
to be widespread, based on a raid of a whale-meat smuggling 
operation in Nagasaki in May of 1994, in which the Japanese 
police seized 11 tons of undocumented whale meat.223 This 
amount is probably only the tip of the iceberg, however, since 
most of the smuggling remains undetected. 
217. Jonathan Friedland, Traffic Problem: Rising Tide of Chinese Illegal Immi-
grants Worries Japan, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Aug. 4,1994, at 20, available in WEST-
LAW, FEER Database, File 1994 WL-FEER 2003406. 
218. Id. 
219. [d. 
220. [d. 
221. Michael D. Lemonick, Animal Genocide, Mob Style, 144:20 TIME, Nov. 14, 
1994, at 77, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL 2805812. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. 
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Finally, the yakuza are believed to smuggle into Japan 
contraband such as cameras, watches, gold, precious stones, 
mink stoles, jewelry, textiles, and Chinese medicines.224 . 
11. Money Laundering 
Due to the enormous amount of income the yakuza syndicates 
derive from illegitimate sources, they need to launder the 
money so it can be invested in legitimate businesses. The 
yakuza have money laundering operations all over the world; 
however, the United States is probably the single biggest place 
where yakuza money is laundered. The most common method 
the yakuza use to launder money is through the use of high-
volume cash businesses such as bars, nightclubs, restaurants, 
gift shops, and casinos.225 
The yakuza have also used golf course country clubs and 
resorts to launder money. The operation is conducted as 
follows: (1) the investors lend illegally obtained money to a 
private investment company; (2) the investment company uses 
new cash to buy a golf club or resort; (3) the resort property 
collects huge membership fees from new members, often 
overselling the maximum number of memberships available; 
(4) the membership fees - the "clean" money - are then 
funneled back to the original investors; and (5) then the 
investment company sells its properties, sometimes at a loss.226 
Another sophisticated money laundering operation was 
conducted in Paris from 1987 to 1992. The operation was 
conducted as follows: (1) the yakuza would wire the money to 
Paris using Asian banks that routed it via Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, and the Channel Islands; (2) yakuza members 
rented an apartment in Paris; (3) they took out ads in Asian-
language newspapers and recruited 300 Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and Japanese people; (4) every morning, each recruit was given 
224. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 198. 
225. [d. at 250. 
226. Ronald Grover, Catherine Yang & Robert Neff, A Japanese Laundry Worth $1 
Billion?, Bus. WK., May 24, 1993, at 38, available in WESTLAW, BUSWK Database, 
File 1993 WL 2142022. . ,:' 
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500 franc notes, and then directed to shops where they 
purchased French designer luxury goods such as handbags and 
scarves; (5) every afternoon, the purchases were deposited at 
the apartment and packed for shipment; and (6) finally, after 
bribing a French Customs official, the goods were exported 
with forged documents back to Japan where they were sold by 
ayakuza shell company.227 
In conclusion, the yakuza are extremely successful at money 
laundering because it is difficult for foreign law enforcement 
officials to trace the money back to Japan for a number of 
reasons. First, Japan generally does not consider the 
movement of "dirty" money to be a crime itself.228 
Furthermore, Japanese bankers usually are not too curious 
about the source of the money and also are reluctant to reveal 
financial information. 
12. Narcotics 
Trafficking of narcotics, especially methamphetamines, is the 
biggest revenue earner for the yakuza. Since .few drugs are 
produced in Japan, nearly every drug and almost all 
stimulants are procured and imported from foreign countries 
such as Peru, Germany, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan. 
One interesting aspect of the yakuza narcotics smuggling 
business is that they have a code of practice for drug couriers, 
which was discovered after a 1979 heroin bust of a yakuza 
member in Hawaii. The code of practice stated: "You should 
obey whatever you are told to do by your group leader. You 
have no choice, you cannot refuse or complain of the leader's 
instructions. The above instructions are given at the request of 
the financier in order to protect ourselves and to accomplish 
our work. Therefore, if you want to work and get paid for it, 
227. Felix Soh, Three-step Process to Money Laundering, STRAIT TIMES, Jan_ B, 
1995, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File. 
22B. Charles J. Hanley, Japanese Crime Organizations Look to America as Land of 
Opportunity, OREGONIAN, Feb. 6, 1994, at A14, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN 
Database. 
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you should follow instructions. [The pay schedule is] five 
thousand dollars for the trip plus $500 more or less for your 
pocket money. Your group leader will determine the amount. 
You must pay for your souvenirs yourself. Your leader will pay 
for your hotel and three meals. He will also pay for your 
drinks, up to $75."229 
As far as the types of narcotics involved, the yakuza smuggle 
approximately 100 pounds per year of heroin into Japan from 
Thailand and Hong Kong.230 However, more importantly, with 
the help of the yakuza the Chinese Triad organized crime 
syndicates are using Japan as a trans-shipment point for 
heroin being shipped to the United States.231 Apparently, the 
Chinese Triads chose this route to avoid U.S. Customs 
procedures due to the fact that ships coming from Japan are 
normally not expected to be smuggling drugs as are ships from 
Thailand.232 
Additionally, the yakuza are believed to be smuggling small 
quantities of marijuana into Japan.233 The yakuza also 
smuggle small quantities of cocaine from Peru into Japan; 
however, the cocaine trade is slow in developing because 
cocaine costs $60,000 to $70,000 per kilogram, which is about 
three times higher than tne cost in the United States.234 
However, the smuggling of methamphetamines is· the single 
biggest source of income for the yakuza, not only in the drug 
trade, but of all the yakuza's illicit activities. The National 
Police Agency of Japan estimates that the methamphetamine 
trade accounts for 43 percent of the illicit income of the yak uza , 
bringing in an estimated $3.38 billion annually.235 However, 
229. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 235. 
230. [d. at 215. 
231. Charles Smith, Dope Dealer's Delight, 147:11 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Mar. 15, 
1990, at 12, at 13. 
232. [d. 
233. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 216. 
234. Smith, supra note 231, at 12. 
235. Teresa Watanabe, Cult May Have Produced Drug, Sold it to Gang, L.A TIMES, 
May 17, 1995, at AI, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 
2047203. 
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other government officials believe the trade may be worth as 
much as $6.66 billion annually.236 Former FBI Director 
William Sessions stated in 1991, that the yakuza controlled an 
estimated 90 percent of the crystal methamphetamine trade in 
Hawaii.237 Furthermore, the approximate street value of 
crystal methamphetamine in Honolulu, as of 1993, was 
$200,000 per kilo.238 
Today, the main source of methamphetamines is from Taiwan, 
where yakuza-trained chemists make the "meth" in yakuza-
fmanced laboratories. 
In conclusion, if the yakuza syndicates are to be controlled to 
any extent, their income from narcotics smuggling must be 
sharply curbed. 
13. Weapons 
. 
In Japan, ordinary citizens are forbidden to manufacture, 
trade, or sell firearms. Despite this absolute gun control, the 
yakuza obtain firearms from smuggling operations in 
Southeast Asia, the United States, the Philippines, France, 
Brazil, Italy, South Mrica, and Russia. The Japanese National 
Police Agency estimates that more than 50 percent of yakuza 
weapons are smuggled from Southeast Asia.239 The syndicates 
are smuggling handguns, shotguns, assault rifles, ammunition 
for the weapons, and even hand grenades. One yakuza 
member even claimed that if someone was willing to pay for it, 
he could obtain a rocket launcher or bazooka.240 
To smuggle these weapons into Japan, the yakuza employ 
couriers not affiliated with the syndicate such as Japanese-
236. Smith, supra note 231, at 12. 
237. Antonio Kamiya, Japanese Mobsters Said Pouring Capital into U.S., JAPAN 
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD 
File. 
238. FBI Announces Arrests of Japanese Crime Figures in Drug Ring, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File. 
239. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 45. 
240. Yakuza Cleanup Pushes Up Prices for Illegal Guns, MAiNiCHI DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 26,1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File. 
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Americans, U.S. military personnel, tourists, students, and 
others; and, with help from overseas brokers, conceal guns 
among goods traded in lawful transactions. For example, guns 
have been smuggled in coffee cans,241 fruit tins,242 blue jeans,243 
inside folk-craft articles, cassette players, video recorder 
cameras, and even inside pineapples, which is an item 
commonly carried by Japanese tourists returning from 
Hawaii.244 Larger quantities of weaponry are often smuggled 
inside the gas tanks of imported cars?45 There is even a 
documented case where a large shipment of handguns from 
Thailand was smuggled inside seven boxes of 70 poisonous 
snakes.246 
The prices of these weapons has dropped dramatically due to 
the 1992 Anti-gang law, which has made life difficult, 
financially, for lower echelon yakuza members. As a result, to 
earn more income the yakuza have now begun to sell the 
weapons to private citizens, which has led to a sharp increase 
in gun-related crimes committed by non-gangsters?47 Today, 
the yakuza can purchase handguns for $1000 to $2000, down 
from a previous high of $7000 to $15,000,248 and then sell them 
to the public for $3000 to $9000 each.249 Additionally, the price 
of United States and Russian-made assault rifles is about three 
million yen, and the price for ammunition is 5,000 to 8,000 yen 
241. Report Warns of Rising Yakuza Activities in U.S., JAPAN ECON. NEWSWlRE, 
Apr. 2, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File. 
242. Guns Smuggled to Japan in Fruit Tins, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 3, 
1995, available in WESTLA W, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 7838709. 
243. Charles J. Hanley, Smuggled U.S. Guns a Big Problem in Japan, BATON 
RoUGE SUNDAY ADVOC., Mar. 27, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, 
File 1994 WL 3963736. 
244. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 256. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 271. 
247. Charles Smith, Out of Gangland: A Glut of Illegal Guns Worries the Authori· 
ties, FAR. EAST. ECON. REV., Feb. 9, 1995, at 32, available in WESTLAW, FEER Data-
base, File 1995 WL-FEER 2271166. 
248. Charles A. Radin, Increasing Gun Violence Shakes Old-Style Japan, SEATILE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 13, 1995, at A2, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Data-
base, File 1995 WL 4301468. . 
249. Michelle Magee, Gun Violence Finally Catches Up With Japan, S.F. CHRON., 
Dec. 20, 1994, at.A1, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL 
4098960. 
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per round for handguns and 30,000 yen per round for 
automatic rifles.250 
Today, gun-smuggling has provided a steady stream of income 
for the yakuza, and it will continue to do so as long as the 
ordinary Japanese citizens have an appetite for firearms. 
14. Sex Industry 
Sex is big business not only in Japan, but across Southeast 
Asia. The yakuza syndicates dominate the sex industry in 
Japan and are heavily involved in prostitution, turkish baths, 
massage parlors, pornography, sex tours, and the sex slave 
trade. 
The sex trade flourishes in Southeast Asia because a majority 
of the people are impoverished, and the only way they can 
make a "better" life for themselves is to turn to prostitution 
themselves or sell their daughters to the slave traders. 
In the early 1970's, the yakuza became involved in arranging 
sex tours for Japanese men to the Philippines, Thailand, and 
South Korea. For example, the yakuza would arrange sex tours 
to South Korea, where the men would visit ''Kisaeng Houses," 
which are prostitution houses.251 The business became so big 
that legitimate hotels, travel agencies, and airlines even got 
into the trade, and they also glamorized the trade through 
advertisements.252 However, in reality, life for the women and 
children who worked in the "Kisaeng Houses" was anything but 
pleasant. Generally, these women and children are 
impoverished migrants from the South Korean countryside who 
are sold on the black market by their families for as little as 
$200, and then forced into a life of prostitution.253 These sex 
tours still continue today, and they continue to be fmanced by 
the yakuza syndicates. 
250. Yakuza Cleanup Pushes Up Prices for Illegal Guns, supra note 240. 
251. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 201. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 202. 
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If anything could be worse than these sex tours, it is the illegal 
sex slave trade, where women knowingly volunteer, or are 
tricked into coming to Japan and working as prostitutes. Some 
women are sold by their families to sex slave traders, and some 
are even kidnapped by them. 'The yakuza have been involved 
in the sex slave trade since the early 1980's. 
The women caught up in the sex slave trade come from 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Australia, 
Central and South America, and the United States. Although 
some women, usually those from Thailand and the Philippines 
who come from poor families and who see this as a way to make 
big money, willingly come to Japan knowing they will be 
prostitutes, the majority of women are tricked into coming to 
Japan. 
For example, in the United States, the yakuza will hire a fly-
by-night talent agency, and this agency will obtain women by 
placing ads for singers and dancers in the entertainment press, 
such as Los Angeles' Drama-logue and Music Connection.254 
When the women get to Japan, instead of being dancers and 
singers, they are forced to become "hostesses" in bars and/or 
prostitutes until they can repay their debts to the yakuza for 
bringing them to Japan.255 
Similar ruses are used on Thai and Filipino women. After 
promises of legitimate jobs, the Thai and Filipino women arrive 
in Japan through yakuza-obtained forged passports, and after 
they arrive their passports are taken from them, and they are 
forced to work as prostitutes to payoff their "debts" to the 
yakuza.256 In "recruiting" the Thai and Filipino women the 
operation goes as follows: the yakuza will hire a local agent 
who promises the women fame and fortune in Japan, then the 
women are told to pay about $2000 for air tickets, 
254. Id. at 252. 
255. Id. 
256. Sex Trade Flourish,ing in Japan, 21:1 WlN NEWS 42 (Winter 1995). 
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accommodations, visas and passports.257 If they cannot pay, 
the money is loaned to them by the yakuza-hired agent, or 
taken out of their salaries.258 The agents will often pay up to 
two months' salary in advance, which may be between $2000 to 
$3000.259 The agent in Thailand or the Philippines then passes 
these costs on to the yakuza in Japan, in addition to a 
commission fee of around $2000.260 After everything is all said 
and done, the women often owe between $15,000 to $20,000 to 
the yakuza which they must repay with interest.261 To ensure 
repayment, as stated previously, the yakuza will confiscate the 
women's forged passports, and being illegal immigrants, the 
Japanese authorities have little sympathy for the women; and, 
as a result, the yakuza have strong leverage over the women. 
It is often difficult, if not impossible in some cases, for these 
women to repay back their debts, because often they are paid 
very little and sometimes when their debt is almost repaid, 
they are resold to another yakuza member and the cycle begins 
all over again.262 
. Today, there are approximately 140,000 Thai and Filipino 
. women working in Japan as prostitutes due to the sex slave 
trade.263 Although no official statistics can be found, there are 
probably thousands of women from other countries working in 
Japan under similar conditions. 
In . conclusion, the sex tours and sex slave trade continue to 
thrive in Japan and whatever other sexual entertainment can 
be found in Japan is either yakuza-owned and operated or 
subject to yakuza protection rackets. 
257. Michael Heazle, The Allure of Japan: Asian Girls Looking for Jobs End Up in 
the Control of the Yakuza, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Oct. 14, 1993, at 38, available in 
WESTLAW, FEER Database, File 1993 WL-FEER 2002492. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Heazle, supra note 257. 
262. Sex Trade Flourishing in Japan, supra note 256. 
263. Id. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The various yakuza syndicates control, influence, and facilitate 
virtually all of the crime that is committed in Japan. They are 
also deeply involved in various crimes such as narcotics, 
fmancial fraud, sex, counterfeiting, and corporate extortion, 
which are affecting other countries. Wherever the yakuza 
syndicates have branched out throughout the world, these 
same types of crimes are being committed, and the commission 
of these crimes, for the most part, goes unhindered because of 
the fear by the local Japanese population of the yakuza, the 
code of silence of the yakuza, and the payment of bribes and 
kickbacks to police and government officials. The yakuza 
probably cannot be completely eliminated from the crime 
business; however, through better law enforcement tactics, 
international cooperation, and new laws, life for the yakuza 
syndicates can be made more difficult. 
VI. FUTURE OF THE YAKUZA 
The question in the minds of many law enforcement officials, 
particularly those in Japan, is what will become of the yakuza 
in the future? To answer this question one must look at 
several factors. 
One factor to consider is the enactment of the Japanese Anti-
gang law in 1992. The law allows police to designate certain 
groups as organized crime groups based on the proportion of 
convicted criminals among their membership and if the group 
has used its name to coercively raise funds?64 The law also 
mandates a crackdown on illicit gambling activities of the 
syndicates and nonviolent offenses such as extortion, loan 
sharking, and intervening in civil suits.265 Additionally, the 
law now allows authorities to confiscate profits from drug 
trafficking, and it allows more severe punishments for persons 
264. Robert Delfs, Legal Conduct, 154:47 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1991, at 
34. 
265. Japan Os New Anti.Gangster Law Takes Effect, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 
1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASlAPC Library, JEN File. 
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involved in smuggling weapons.266 In 1993, Japan revised the 
Anti-gang law to prohibit activities such as forcing unwilling 
companies to buy or sell stocks, demanding unlawful margin 
trading on securities transactions, scalping of entertainment 
tickets, disrupting auctions, and unreasonable demands for 
discounting notes.267 The revision also prohibits yakuza groups 
from forcing members to get tattoos and from cutting off their 
fingertips.268 
Although the new law has had some effect on the yakuza 
syndicates in the form of reducing the total number of yakuza 
members, it has some flaws and unwanted side-effects. Some 
problems with the law are that it does not make the yakuza 
gangs illegal, nor does it deal with the problems of companies 
owned or indirectly controlled by the yakuza and used as a 
front for illegal activities. To circumvent the law, many 
syndicates are tearing . down their signs above their 
headquarters and are reorganizing themselves as religious 
organizations, political organizations, and as corporations. For 
example, in 1992, the yakuza syndicates held a meeting and 
distributed a manual entitled How to Evade the New LaW.269 
This manual advises gangs to stop looking and behaving like 
violent outfits and to pose instead as legitimate businesses, 
religious organizations, or political organizations?70 Many 
officials in Japan believe that the laws have also had an 
unwanted side-effect, namely, driving the yakuza underground 
and deeper into commercial business where they will continue 
to thrive and be even harder to detect.271 For example, in 1992 
the Yamaguchi-gumi ordered its affiliated gangs to register as 
boards, and local bosses were told to make themselves 
chairmen or presidents of their companies, which would each 
266. [d. 
267. Police Draft Revision Bill to Curb Financial Crimes, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, 
Feb. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File. 
268. [d. 
269. Tom Ormonde, Cracking Down on the 'Yakuza', 39:5 WORLD PRESS REV. 48 
(May 1992). 
270. [d. 
271. [d. 
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be capitalized with 10 million yen. They were also told to elect 
their most talented lieutenants as directors?72 
Since the Yamaguchi-gumi continues to absorb smaller 
syndicates and is still the largest yakuza syndicate in Japan, it 
would appear that the Yamaguchi-gumi's restructuring plan 
has worked.' 
A second factor to consider in determining the yakuza's future 
is public opinion. 
TraditiOIlally, the Japanese public has accepted the yakuza to 
some degree as long as they stayed within the boundaries of 
prostitution, gambling, extortion, and did not commit acts of 
violence and robbery against the ordinary citizens. Today, this 
social contract appears to be breaking down as the syndicates 
become more violent and begin to prey increasingly on the 
common citizens through both extortion and intimidation. It 
appears as though the new yakuza members are more 
interested in making money, than honoring feudal traditions 
such as not harassing the local citizenry. Despite this change 
in yakuza operational tactics, however, many Japanese still 
cling to the romanticized image of the yakuza as feudal Robin 
Hoods who follow the virtues of humanity and justice?73 
To effectively reduce the power of the yakuza, the Japanese 
police need the help of the public; and, if the public continues to 
view the yakuza as honorable outlaws, the police will have a 
very difficult time combating the syn~icates. 
Another factor is the yakuza's traditional ties with the police 
and government officials. Although Japanese police claim to be 
corrupt-free, nothing could be further from the truth. For 
example, in 1983 a nationwide tip-off syndicate run by police 
officers was uncovered.274 . This syndicate would tip-off yakuza 
syndicates about upcoming police raids and in return the 
yakuza would pay them sums of money that ranged upwards of 
272. Japan; Tycoons of Crime, supra note 88. 
273. Ormonde, supra note 269, at 48. 
274. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 160. 
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$12,000.275 Furthermore, in 1983, a bribery scandal surfaced in 
which 123 members of the police were involved.276 
Additionally, there has always been an unspoken cooperation 
between the police and yakuza, in that if the yakuza's 
operations did not go beyond accepted boundaries, the police 
would leave them alone, and in return, the yakuza would act as 
an alternative police force in suppressing unorganized street 
crime.277 
Additionally, the yakuza still maintain connections to the 
upper-echelon of power in the government as is evidenced by 
recent political scandals, as discussed previously. Although 
these connections are not as apparent as they were in years 
past, they still exist in the form of yakuza members acting as 
campaign officials, bodyguards, and fund-raisers.278 These 
connections have become even more blurred as many 
syndicates have reorganized as political organizations. 
What also makes it difficult to detect collusion between the 
police, government officials, and the yakuza is that the concept 
of bribery in Japan is muddled, largely because the custom of 
gift-giving is so widespread and thoroughly institutionalized.279 
In some cases, the person receiving the gift or bribe is socially 
not allowed to ask any questions. 
A fourth factor is that many businesses find the yakuza's 
services useful. For example, the banks, as stated previously, 
have used them for debt collection. Also, real-estate developers 
have used them to "persuade" reluctant landowners and 
tenants to sell or vacate their premises. Finally, the yakuza 
have been used by government officials and businesses for the 
purpose of breaking up labor strikes. 
What is clear is that the yakuza will continue to thrive as long 
as the public continues to view them as Robin Hoods and 
275. [d. 
276. [d. at 159. 
277. [d. at 163. 
278. [d. at 116. 
279. [d. at 165. 
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powerful politicians and businessmen continue to find them 
useful. 
Another factor which helps the yakuza to thrive overseas is a 
lack of Japanese police cooperation with foreign law 
enforcement officials. For example, the Japanese police 
operate under a "dual criminality" standard, which means that 
they will disseminate information only if the alleged criminal 
activity is also a crime in Japan.280 
A sixth factor is that Japan does not have an American-style 
RICO law or money laundering laws, which may be necessary 
before any comprehensive attempt to reduce yakuza activities 
can take place.281 
A seventh factor is that many Japanese citizens and corporate 
officials fail to report yakuza crimes they have been the victim 
of due to the all important value of saving face in Japan. 
Similar to this factor is the code of silence practiced by the 
yakuza whereby a member will be severely punished if he 
reveals any secrets of the syndicate. 
The final factor is that beyond the changes in structure, 
authority, and violence, the yakuza are opting for crimes of 
greater sophistication. Now, there are the intellectual yakuza 
who are white-collar criminals and their economic crimes are 
extremely hard to detect.282. The yakuza have proved to be 
highly adaptable to adverse situations, and the newer yakuza 
members are better-educated, better-traveled, and more 
sophisticated; as a result, it appears as though the new yakuza 
will be able to adapt to new adversities that are thrown their 
way in the future. 
Therefore, in my opinion the yakuza will continue to thrive and 
adapt as needed for. the following reasons: (1) the yakuza have 
adapted to and survived the enactment of the Anti-gang law; 
(2) the public still holds a romanticized view of the yakuza as 
280. Anderson, supra note 151. 
281. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 43. 
282. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 275. 
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honorable outlaws; (3) the yakuza still have strong ties to the 
police and powerful government officials; (4) many businesses 
find the yakuza's services useful; (5) a lack of Japanese police 
cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials; (6) a lack of 
money laundering and RICO laws; (7) the reluctance of 
Japanese citizens to report crimes due to Japanese emphasis 
on resolving disputes through extralegal means and the all 
important concept of saving face in Japan; (8) the code of 
silence practiced by the yakuza; and (9) the increasing 
sophistication and ability to adapt of the yakuza themselves 
and their operations. 
However, this does not mean that the fight against theyakuza 
is hopeless, it just means that it will be extremely difficult; 
although I do believe that completely eliminat~g the yakuza 
syndicates is impossible. Japan and other countries can reduce 
the power of the yakuza by: (1) educating the population that 
the yakuza are purely criminals and not Robin Hoods; (2) 
increasing international cooperation between police forces; (3) 
enacting RICO and money laundering laws; (4) using 
immigration controls to prevent known yakuza members from 
entering their countries; (5) cutting off the yakuza's main 
source of recruits, the burakumin, which will be impossible to 
do unless Japanese society changes and allows these people to 
climb the social ladder another way; (6) cleaning up the 
structural corruption in government and law enforcement; and 
(7) cutting them off from their major source of income: 
methamphetamines, which will require international 
cooperation between military and law enforcement officials of 
Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and others. 
In conclusion, while the future of the yakuza remains 
unknown, it is a fact that despite the present control efforts 
directed against the yakuza, their activities in illegal, 
semilegal, and official Japanese business and politics will 
continue unless the steps described above are taken, 
particularly steps toward elimination of structural corruption 
and political and societal reform. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The yakuza syndicates have gained footholds in Japanese 
communities around the world, invested enormous sums of 
money throughout the world, and formed strategic alliances 
with Chinese and American organized crime groups. 
The yakuza are an exceptional organized crime group, and in 
the 20th century they have often played a major role in the 
highest levels of Japanese politics. They have carved out a 
secure niche for themselves and have accumulated more open 
wealth than gangsters anywhere else in the world. The 
yak uza , in every phase of their .centuries-Iong history, have 
gone to great lengths to court public opinion, to make 
themselves acceptable, and the public has traditionally 
accepted them as long as they have not committed violent acts 
against the public. However, this social contract is coming 
apart at the seams as the yakuza have recently been 
committing such violent acts against the common people. 
Whether the Japanese can successfully alter some of the 
ancient relationships between the yakuza, public, police, and 
government remains to be seen. Organized crime in Japan has 
grown extremely powerful since World War II, and like 
organized crime everywhere, once it has become entrenched, it 
is almost impossible to eliminate. It can be contained in Japan 
and abroad, however, through international cooperation, 
adoption of new laws, better detection methods, and most 
importantly with the help of concerned citizens and corrupt-
free law enforcement and government officials. This will be 
difficult, if not impossible, also, because the yakuza have 
proved to be highly adaptive to adverse changes and as long as 
there are. powerful elements in business and politics who find 
the yakuza useful, they will continue to exist and thrive. 
What is clear is that over the past 300 years, the yakuza have 
become one of the world's most powerful and successful 
criminal organizations, and that whatever the government and 
public does, these once honorable Japanese outlaws are bound 
to be around for centuries to come. 
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